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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS
PUZZLE
RichardA. Epsteint
The topic of this discussion is unconstitutional conditions.
I have written a book, Bargaining with the State,1 which discusses the topic. However, Judge Randolph's brief introduction
has raised a number of questions I have not thought about at
all. This proves how rich, complicated, and convoluted the
subject is. In this short talk, I will take refuge in a safe harbor
open to all academics, and discuss the basic theory of the
subject. My speech will be in the form of a political and intellectual puzzle that urgently requires some principled resolution.
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions asks whether or
not the government may attach certain conditions - the potential range is well-nigh infinite - to particular grants or contracts. If you look at recent cases on that subject, you will
discover immediately that squarely and staunchly in the freedom of contract camp is a notable market economy stalwart
Justice William J. Brennan. If, for example, you read his
Nollan dissent,2 you will discover that if the government can
stop a new development from proceeding, it may certainly
condition the grant of the requisite permits on the surrender of
a lateral easement across the front of the property. After all,
Brennan asserts, you could always reject the deal and lose
nothing you already have, or you can accept the bargain which
will both be in your interest and the state's interest. The entire
transaction exhibits the gains from trade that conservative
economists praise. According to Justice Brennan, under the
circumstances, it was perfectly appropriate for the state to
impose a condition on the permit power grant.
Brennan's challenge is this: why is it strong believers in
the scope of both federal and state power are also ardent champions of the doctrine of freedom of contract when the government is a party to the transaction? Why would they take that
position when similar transactions made by private parties
would be considered instruments of exploitation and advantage?

t Professor, University of Chicago Law School
RICHARD A. EPsTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993).
2 Nollan

v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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I am an equal opportunity critic. Therefore, I must criticize
the opposing argument. There are conservative justices who are
deeply supportive of freedom of contract in market settings, but
who become profoundly suspicious of its logic when the transactions have government as a party. Just as Justice Brennan

wrote the dissent in Nollan, Justice Scalia graced us with his
court opinion holding the "greater" power to exclude new construction did not carry with it the "lesser" power to permit that
new construction upon the easement's surrender.3 Judges who
do not like discussing exploitation, extortion, inequality of
bargaining power, or abusive exchanges in the private sector
curiously adopt this logic in cases where government contracts
resemble voluntary transactions. So "who's on first"? What's
going on here? How are we going to resolve this mess? Is there
something in this debate that makes sense, or is it a question of
simple intellectual opportunism on all sides?
This problem is of special importance to me because I, for
these purposes, fall underneath the broad umbrella of conservatism. Though I am not a Republican, no one would ever mistake me for a Democrat, particularly regarding domestic issues
relating to government regulation and taxation. The difficulty
is how to decide who is correct and who is incorrect for at least
part of the time.
I think the point of departure for this discussion is to look
for close private analogies to public transactions. There is a
two-tier understanding of contract that proves helpful here. At
stage one, it is very easy to understand there are all sorts of
rules that prohibit fraud, that prohibit a duress, and that protect the insane and incompetent. However, at stage two which
travels beyond these clear cases, there is another private contract law strand which discusses bargaining power inequalities
without opening up the world to the New Deal state. Thus,
there are particular rules dealing with contracts for marine
salvage, or other transactions entered into under conditions of
necessity, or under circumstances where one person is under
immediate danger to lose life and limb.
These necessity situations all involve monopoly situations,
or more precisely, bilateral monopoly situations. In those
contexts, even on the private side, freedom of contract will not
be fully operative. The persons who extract large sums of
money to provide what would be (absent their monopoly posi-
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.tion) routine, ordinary services, will find their bargains are not
enforced. They will not, however, leave the table uncompensated, nor will they be in a worse position than their pre-transaction state. Instead, they will be limited to some just rate of
return on the property and labor they committed to the particular venture. These are cases of just compensation and are not
cases of total contractual invalidity. To the common lawyer,
ordinary property rights are suspended under conditions of
necessity. To the economist, everyone is in a better position if
they are forced to commit to a system of competitive pricing in
advance, notwithstanding momentary, transient pockets of
monopoly power.
This view of the world should provide us with an important
clue to understanding the bargaining process with the state.
The government does not have transient monopolies such as
those given to the dock owner in the great case of Vincent v.
Lake Erie TransportationCo.4 When the issue is permits and
licenses, the government has a permanent monopoly presence
which must be constitutionally neutralized if citizens are to be
able to deal on a level playing field, and if government conduct
is to be properly constrained. The issue is not any particular
-exchange's mutual gain, which is Justin Brennan's exclusive
concern, but is instead the long-term governments' incentives to
establish certain patterns of behavior, secure in the knowledge
they will have enormous leverage against citizens.
That concern expresses itself in two ways. First, suppose
I happen to steal your watch and then offer to sell it back to
you. That second transaction is surely a slight improvement
over the prior state of the world in which I keep your watch and
you keep your money. However, if we allow the thief to resell
the stolen goods, we induce a higher initial level of theft. It is
easy to see why we place prohibitions on the second transaction
to reduce the first transaction's (the theft's) probability of
occurring.
Surprisingly, in the unconstitutional concerns areas, the
Government is often in the business of taking. Accordingly,
everyone should be desperately concerned that the Government
will take things with one hand, and then, with the other hand,
sell these things back to individuals (or in a federal system, the

" 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (Boat owner who moored his vessel at a
private dock during a storm was required to pay dock owner for damages to
dock caused by boat).
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states) with conditions imposed upon the individuals which the
Government could never have directly imposed.
This is what I call the twin perils in bargaining with the
state: the bargaining risks associated with bi-lateral monopoly,
and the taking associated with taxation. Therefore, a sensible
view of freedom of contract in the private arena should transfer
to the public arena. It explains why the Government should be
under greater scrutiny when contracting than the scrutiny
ordinary, private individuals receive. Government's coercive
power and its monopoly position often are creatures of statutes.
Thus, its bargains should be carefully scrutinized. After having
stated that basic proposition, I can now address the unconstitutional conditions paradox at a highly theoretical level and can
attempt to resolve it.
The proper approach is this: in the usual situation, we can
assume each party's position ex post is better than its ex ante
position. Thus, there is nothing about which to complain.
Under this standard, Justice Brennan is correct when he insists
anybody who capitulates to a Government demand in a permit
struggle is in a better position after receiving the permit, even
though that party had to surrender an easement over his
property. However, using a different.perspective, we should ask
ourselves: what would be the result if the bargain proceeded
without the condition? Would that position be preferable to
proceeding with the condition or preferable to having no bargain? When state transactions impose a monopoly power risk,
a world without some particular condition will, on balance,
produce greater net worth than a world subject to that condition.5 If this is true, we have the familiar baseline problem: do
we treat the baseline by which we judge gains and losses as the
status quo ante, or do we treat it as the hypothetical optimal
bargain world with bargains sans conditions?
Viewing the world through this lens, it is quickly apparent
-that certain conditional bargains, when examined for their
substantive effect, will be wealth-destroying relative to unconditional bargains. Other conditional bargains will be wealthenhancing and should be allowed. However, when the conditions are wealth-destroying conditions, we are confident that the
state is in a better position when the transaction is unconditional, than when the transaction is never completed. Therefore,

' For numerical examples of the various permutations, see RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE supra note 1, at 99.
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the condition should be eliminated for social welfare reasons.
The question is how to identify which kinds of conditions are
bad and which kinds of conditions are good. The constitutional
question is to find a means to address these concerns.
Here are a few easy examples. First, suppose that a party
who wants to use the public highways of a particular state must
agree to submit to that state's jurisdiction if any traffic accident
occurs in that jurisdiction. In 1925, when the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court faced that question, it gave the usual
"bitter with the sweet" rationale and stated that this condition
was perfectly appropriate. 6 That result was reached by a court
which believed in the necessity of taking the "bitter with the
sweet". This rationale is too broad because it allows any condition to be attached to private use of the public roads. However,
it appears both sides are in better positions because they have
prompt resolutions of their dispute. Therefore, that condition
should be considered wealth-enhancing.
Second, suppose the state says: you may use the pubic
highways only if you agree to be regulated as a common carrier.
In addition, we will set minimum monopoly prices for your
services. That condition pulls us away from the competitive
equilibrium and should be struck down. It was struck down in
one case,7 but upheld in another case.'
Third, though economic liberty issues are not strong arguments today, however, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions still survives. This doctrine allows the state to say: you
may use the public highways only if you sacrifice your First
Amendment rights, agree to pay dues to a religious organization
not of your own choosing, or vote for the dominant political
party in the next election. Justice Brennan would have joined
with Justice Scalia to strike down these conditions. It is important to ask, what is going on under these circumstances? We
cannot understand how the operation of the highways will be
improved by these types of collateral conditions. As expected,
6 In re Opinion of the Justices, 147 N.E. 681 (Mass. 1925).

' Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. California Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583
(1926) (private carrier who faced revocation of business license if he failed to
get permit to use public highways was found to have been deprived of his
property without due process of law).
8 Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932) (Texas practice of charging
rates to common carriers to use public highways and charging private carriers
the same or greater rate was neither a taking nor an interference with
contract).
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these are exactly the types of conditions courts have systematically struck down. It does not matter that the "bitter with the
sweet" rhetoric applies to all cases, regardless of the condition's
content.
In these hypothetical situations, there is a broad jurisprudential issue. Though one might want to swallow the bitter (in
order to gain the sweet) and invoke the Hobbesian injunction
that the content of a given transaction should be left to the
appetite of the parties who know their own interests, it is not a
rational position. It is no longer possible to state that parties
make contracts and the state enforces them, because some
knowledge of market conditions is necessary. Where monopoly
power lodges in the government, a substantive examination of
the contract for constitutional challenges is strictly necessary
before its terms are upheld. The bargaining risks and the
takings risks are too pervasive to be overlooked or ignored when
the government is involved.
Of course, working with this doctrine is not easy. It is still
necessary to determine which level of scrutiny should be
brought to any examination of government activities. The
government does not own a "free pass" to confiscate. The courts
must delineate limits on state power. Yet, the solution to the
first difficulty immediately raises a second difficulty: to what
extent can we expect judges to respect the fine-spun distinctions
in this area? Our next speaker, Judge Steven Williams does not
believe that it is possible his colleagues on the bench can negotiate the pitfalls of this doctrine. He thinks a passive approach is
better than the mischief theorists, like myself, are all too eager
to create. I disagree with him. The Supreme Court often does
its best when it tries its hardest. It only tries its hardest when
it believes there is some abuse of the political process that it
should correct. The stark abuse of power cases using strings
and conditional grants should spur the Court to greater action,
and should spur Judge Williams and his colleagues to perform
at the high judicial diligence level we expect from them. In
principle, we can resolve the puzzle of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. However, it requires judges with courage
and intelligence to make sure we do not lose our way in our
constant effort to use responsible judicial behavior to combat
legislative excesses.

HeinOnline -- 4 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 471 1994-1995

